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2026 08 17 How does Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy challenge the idea of internal mental representations? Gemini Chat

In his late masterpiece, Philosophical Investigations (1953), Ludwig Wittgenstein mounted one of the most radical attacks in modern philosophy against the idea of internal mental representations.

Mainstream cognitive science and computational philosophy assume that to think, remember, or speak, the brain must consult an internal storehouse of symbols, data structures, or mental images. Wittgenstein argued that this entire picture is an illusion born from a misunderstanding of how language actually works.

His challenge rests on four interconnected arguments:

1. Dismantling the "Augustinian Picture" (Meaning Is Use, Not an Inner Object)

Wittgenstein begins the Investigations by attacking what he calls the Augustinian picture of language: the intuitive belief that every word refers to an object, and that sentences are combinations of names referring either to external physical things or internal mental ideas.

Augustinian / Representationalist View:
  Word ("Chair")  ──►  Internal Mental Representation  ──►  Physical Object

Wittgenstein's View:
  Word ("Chair")  ──►  Public Practice / Use in a Language-Game (No intermediary required)

  • Meaning as Use (Gebrauch): Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of a word is not an entity it stands for—whether physical or mental—but its use in public human activity (what he called a language-game, embedded in a shared form of life).

  • The Intermediary is Redundant: When a carpenter shouts "Slab!" to an assistant, the assistant doesn't consult an internal pixel-map or computational symbol of a slab, decode it, and then act; the assistant simply passes the slab. Inserting a "mental representation" between hearing a word and acting adds an unnecessary, hypothetical middleman.

2. The "Beetle in the Box" (Why Internal States Drop Out of Language)

To show that internal representations cannot be the source of public meaning, Wittgenstein introduced his famous Beetle in the Box thought experiment (§293):

"Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty."

  • The Application to Mental Life: If "pain," "understanding," or "concept of a triangle" were private mental objects inside an internal cognitive "box," we could never know if two people had the same internal representation.

  • Yet, we successfully use these words every day. Therefore, public communication cannot depend on the nature of whatever is in the private box. The internal representation simply "drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

3. The Rule-Following Paradox & The Problem of the Signpost

Cognitive science asserts that the mind follows internal rules or manipulates symbolic representations to solve problems. Wittgenstein showed that an internal representation cannot tell you how to interpret itself (§198–§201).

  • The Signpost Metaphor: Imagine a painted arrow pointing right. Does the arrow force you to walk in the direction of the point, or in the direction of the feathers?

  • An arrow is just a physical shape. It only means "go right" because of a shared cultural custom and training.

  • The Infinite Regress: If you claim an internal mental representation or rule guides your behavior, what tells you how to interpret that representation? You would need a secondary rule to interpret the first rule, and a third to interpret the second, leading into an infinite regress.

Interpretation must stop somewhere—not at a magical, self-interpreting internal symbol, but at practical, unreflective action in the world ("When I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly." §219).

4. "Understanding" Is an Ability, Not a Mental Process

In cognitive science and computer functionalism, "understanding" is treated as an internal computational state or neural firing event. Wittgenstein argued this commits a fundamental grammatical mistake:

Concept The Representationalist Claim Wittgenstein's Grammatical Analysis
"Understanding" A hidden mental/neural process running in the background. An ability or capacity (know-how), like knowing how to swim or play chess.
"I understand!" A report on a sudden internal data state. An exclamation of competence: "Now I can go on!" (a signal that one can perform the task).
"Remembering" Accessing a stored mental file or internal record. An activity demonstrated through public behavior (recounting, drawing, finding).

If a teacher asks a student to continue the mathematical sequence 2, 4, 6, 8..., and the student writes 10, 12, 14, the student understands the rule. Understanding is verified by their performance in the shared practice, not by inspecting a hypothetical mental representation inside their skull.

Why Cognitive Science Created the Fiction of Representations

Wittgenstein diagnosed the impulse behind representationalism as a craving for hidden mechanisms:

  1. Substantive Fallacy: Because "thought," "mind," and "memory" are nouns in our grammar, we assume there must be physical or mental substances corresponding to them.

  2. The Inner Theatre: When we close our eyes, we can imagine a red apple. We then assume all thinking must consist of consulting similar internal slides or data structures.

To Wittgenstein, cognitive scientists who search for "internal representations" are like people who look at the rules of chess and then search inside the wooden pawns to find the "essence of the game." The mind is not an inner computational stage; it is the living, embodied pattern of our activities within a human community.